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JPRS L/9156 19 June 1980

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

**FOUO No. 679** 



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# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

LAGOS ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING REVIEWED

Six Measures for Saving Africa

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 pp 23-26

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] Twenty years after the first African countries became independent, is each of the OAU's 50 member states going to continue singing its own refrain on the subject of development or are they going to make up their minds to seriously follow the same tune? That obsessing question was supposed to be answered by the first economic summit meeting, which was held in Lagos, Nigeria on 28 and 29 April.

This is certainly not the first time that African leaders have cast an anguished eye on the continent's economic realities. Back in May 1973 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, an OAU ministerial council had reached a disturbing diagnosis—and recommended solutions that would have led to a regrouping of the states. More recently, a conference sponsored in Monrovia, Liberia by the pan-African organization drew the attention of our leaders to the dangers threatening Africa—and recommended measures aimed at "national and collective self—sufficiency in economic and social development."

But this time Edem Kodjo, the OAU's Togolese secretary general, wasted no words in telling the Africans the truth, no matter how bitter. Misery, horror, despair, catastrophe and disaster were some of the words with which he peppered the 30-page introductory report he presented to the council of ministers before the Lagos summit meeting. The secretary general exclaimed: "Africa is in danger of death. Its survival is in question--yes, Africa is dying." In his opinion, the policies pursued by our states over the past 20 years are leading straight to "modern slavery and to the physiological deficiencies which degrade the African and reduce his capacity for action."

But Kodjo did not fail to point out that the continent has enormous potential.

The fact is that Africa covers 30 million square kilometers (28 percent of the world's landmass), and its 400 million inhabitants are sitting on fabulous

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natural resources representing 97 percent of the world's chrome reserves, 85 percent of its platinum, 64 percent of its gold, 50 percent of its manganese, 25 percent of its uranium, and 13 percent of its copper. Not to mention diamonds, bauxite, nickel, and lead—all ores in which the continent is way ahead as far as world reserves are concerned. Africa also has 20 percent of the world's hydroelectric potential and 20 percent of all the petroleum marketed in the world. In the agricultural area, it accounts for 70 percent of the world's cocca production, one—third of its coffee, and 50 percent of its palmetto.

Unfortunately, so much wealth in the soil or under it does not prevent Africa from experiencing a slow and continual deterioration of its economy. It makes one think of the man starving to death while sitting on piles of gold and diamonds whose value—and above all whose utility—are unknown to him. The fact remains that despite those enormous potentialities, the continent's economic picture currently looks extremely somber.

The gross national product of the OAU's 50 member states represents only 2.7 percent of the worldwide figure! Putting it another way, all those countries combined produce barely as much as the three Benelux countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In 1977, 13 African countries had a per capita income of less than \$200, 23 had between \$200 and \$500, 12 had between \$500 and \$2,000, 2 had between \$2,000 and \$5,000, and only one enjoyed a per capita income of more than \$5,000. In 20 years—from 1960 to 1980—the rate of economic growth has averaged only 4.8 percent. And even that figure includes the results achieved by the petroleum-producing countries. If they are excluded, the figure drops to 2.9 percent, or barely equal to the rate of population growth.

In that overall picture, food production is evolving in an even more disturbing manner. In the 1950's—that is, before the countries became independent—the yields from Africa's main crops showed the following percentages in terms of worldwide averages: wheat: 72 percent; rice: 60 percent; millet: 105 percent; corn: 55 percent; and peanuts: 82 percent. But 20 years later, those figures have all fallen and now show the following percentages: wheat: 45 percent; rice: 55 percent; millet: 95 percent; corn: 44 percent; and peanuts: 71 percent. What this means is that production methods are deteriorating steadily in Africa while improving in the rest of the world. That is not surprising when one considers that, among other things, Africa's total number of tractors represents barely 2 percent of the worldwide total and that the policies governing producer prices are everywhere one of the main hindrances to the fostering of agriculture.

One can therefore understand why Africa is doomed to import more and more in order to feed itself—that is, to sell more and more cocoa, coffee, cotton, and peanuts to procure the foodstuffs it needs. In 1970, 15 percent of the gross domestic product was used to import foodstuffs. And the volume of those imports is rising steadily: from an index of 100 in the 1950's to 135 in the 1970's. To feed itself, Africa bought 5.3 million tons of cereals

in 1960, but in 1970 it bought 7.3 million (an increase of 2 million tons). Kodjo said, "If I lay so much stress on the food situation, it is because unless something is done, there is no salvation for us, our states, or our people." And it is undeniable that without self-sufficiency in food, there is not and cannot be political independence.

## Overpowering Picture

Unfortunately, the shortcomings are not limited solely to the food sector. They also exist, sometimes even more disquietingly, in other areas. According to the OAU secretary general, the health picture is "terrifying": at 19 percent, the death rate is the highest in the world. Of every 10 infants born in Africa, two die before completing their first year and only six live to the age of 5 years. Africa has the sorry record of offering the shortest life expectancy in the world: 47 years, compared to a worldwide average of 55.

The picture is hardly any more brilliant in the field of energy. With a total production in 1976 of 130 billion kilowatt-hours, Africa accounted for barely 2 percent of the world's electricity production. The installed capacity of all its hydroelectric plants represents only 5.6 percent of the continent's known potential. And this despite the huge energy reserves represented, for example, by the fabulous sites of Inga in Zaire, Cabora Bassa in Mozambique, and Konkoure in Guinea. Not to mention solar energy, which is so abundant in that veritable gold belt where most African countries are located! While we devastate our forests at an accelerated pace and import larger and larger quantities of hydrocarbons from abroad, we have to note-supreme paradox—that our petroleum consumption represents only one-fifth of our production!

The situation is equally far from brilliant as far as industrialization is concerned. Manufactured products accounted for 10 percent of the GDP in 1960, but in 1970 they amounted to only 11.5 percent, for an increase of only 1.5 percent in 10 years! Between 1971 and 1976, the rate of employment in industry totaled 5.8 percent in North Africa, 5.6 percent in West Africa, and 2.7 percent in East Africa.

As far as Africa's weight in world industrial production is concerned, it is quite simply insignificant: 0.9 percent! Lastly, need we be reminded that the merchant fleet of Africa proper (South Africa and Liberia excluded) represents only 0.4 percent of the world fleet, even though Africa is involved in 13 percent of the maritime trade?

Anyone who takes other than a complacent look at the miserable situation in education—miserable despite its considerable share of the budget in most of our countries—will understand the tragedy being played out before our eyes. Because of the educational system adopted, is not Africa the only continent being made to lose its own values through education?

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In such conditions, it is understandable that the OAU secretary general should depart from his usual reserve and send out a real cry of alarm. The economic picture presented by Africa after 20 years of independence is so "somber" and so "overpowering" that it is essential for every African to be aware of it. The fact that the OAU secretary general had the courage not only to acknowledge this but also to proclaim it from the pan-African forum is a sign of the times. Perhaps the assertion of those truths, which visibly moved and shook the chiefs of state and ministers present in Lagos, will make it possible to approach the future with more "seriousness," as Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was to demand.

## Alarming Forecasts

At the rate things are going, in any case, Africa's future is in danger, as the French agronomist Rene Dumont prophesied some 15 years ago, of not being a "festive future"—quite the contrary. According to the experts, our population is going to double between now and the year 2000, when it will total 813 million, and by 2075 it will be 2.5 billion. The generation between the ages of 5 and 15 will grow from 105 million in 1975 to 216 million in 2000. In the same period, the GDP will rise by only 4.3 percent annually (less than the percentage recorded in the 1960's), while the average annual growth rate will rise from today's 2.55 percent to... 2.9 percent. The agricultural forecasts in particular are alarming. At the start of the 1970's, Africa supplied 90 percent of its own food needs, but the percentage will be no more than from 60 to 68 percent in the year 2000.

## Disastrous Extraversion

What are the causes of this drifting? In the opinion of Edem Kodjo and the African experts he consulted before the Lagos summit meeting, the source of the tumor is definitely localized. It is called extraversion. What that means in plain language is excessive dependence on foreign countries. As is well known, the characteristic feature of African economies is that in all sectors they are excessively oriented to the outside world. Kodjo said, "It is to the outside that we look, and it is from the outside that we expect our basic concepts to come." And he explained that as an example, we naively believed in the classic models of economic growth, basing our hopes on the growth and development of the "center" as a means of "seeding" and creating the development of the "periphery." He added that we also vaguely accepted the model authored by Walt Rostow (a well-known American economist) concerning the stages of growth and believed that the process of development adopted by the Western World could blandly be applied to Africa.

But experience has shown that those theories, brilliant as they are (although even the Western World is turning away from them), do not provide a prescription likely to cure the African illness. They take into account neither the structures proper to our societies nor the interest of the majority. In most cases, those models tend only to trap the African economies in the nets of the West's economy. And that with no regard for the consequences, one of

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the most striking of which is the continual deterioration of the terms of trade. Essentially, our economic action "consists, when all is said and done, of working ourselves to death to earn foreign exchange, which we then hurry to spend abroad to acquire manufactured goods, especially foodstuffs."

That tendency by the Africans to give precedence to foreign countries and to ogle foreign countries rather than sweeping their own doorstep is evident in many other areas as well. It is well known that in transportation and communications, air and telephone links are infinitely more convenient between each of our countries and the former colonial powers than between two neighboring African countries. This is also true in the case of currency, where the diversity of monetary zones prevents the development of inter-African trade, while each nation has formed solid ties with countries abroad.

## Used Everywhere

Is not the policy of extraversion also the source of the propensity of African leaders to expect too much from international negotiations? It is a fact, in any case, that with its eyes forever riveted abroad, Africa has entered into all kinds of international agreements, organizations, pacts, treaties, and understandings.

Despite the numerical weight of their 50 states (one-third of the UN member-ship), the Africans have been unable to take advantage of their negotiating power.

Whether in the United Nations or UNCTAD, in the North-South negotiations, or even in the Group of 77 (which in fact numbers almost 100, of which half are African), we are used everywhere simply as pawns and toys in the hands of the superpowers and sometimes—this is especially distressing—of medium—sized or even secondary powers! The result is that in 20 years of independence we have not managed to obtain anything of real consequence from most of the demands formulated so noisily by the African group. Concerning the organization of basic markets, for example, we have obtained agreements covering only six or seven products. The meager results of the UNCTAD V Meeting in Manila, or the frustrations in which the Third General UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] Conference, recently held in New Delhi, ended, are well known.

## What Next?

The latest Lome Convention, known as Lome II, itself ended in colorless fashion owing to the low level of financial aid provided within the framework of STABEX [expansion unknown] and the low volume of credits allocated for financing the stabilization system for ores (SYSMIN [expansion unknown]). As for our demands concerning a reform of the international monetary system, it seems that they have since been buried under words.

The picture is somber, and the OAU secretary general said so. He did not avoid the fact. But neither did he simply note the situation and criticize

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it. He made specific proposals in Lagos. After noting that within the institutional limits inherited from the colonial system, no African country currently has a market large enough to insure its own rapid and harmonious economic development, Edem Kodjo recommended the establishment on a continent-wide basis of a "real common market--organized, planned, and perfectly integrated." He said that his six-point proposal, the only valid response to the challenge facing Africa, must see the light of day before the year 2000. It is based on the growth of inter-African trade, self-sufficiency in food, interconnection of the means of communication and of telecommunications, and the effort for industrialization, as well as exploitation of Africa's energy potential.

But while taking their inspiration from Kwame Nkrumah, the late Ghanaian leader, Edem Kodjo and the African experts surrounding him show themselves to be more realistic. Instead of demanding immediate realization of the African common market they want, they are calling for intermediate stages.

They are proposing that four major regions be set up over the next 10 years: West, East, Center, and North. Each region will have about 100 million inhabitants, the optimum they consider necessary for each one's full industrialization. Not until the year 2000 will the four regions become integrated to form the single and perfectly integrated market destined to save Africa.

Before that happens, an action plan will be adopted with well-defined priorities. These will be aimed at self-sufficiency in food thanks to the development of river and lake basins, the development of an integrated transportation system (roads, railroads, and air and maritime traffic), the modernization of telecommunications within Africa, and the development of industry and energy.

The OAU secretary general went so far as to recommend the immediate establishment of an African common market in the field of energy. On that point he found no support. And neither was he supported on the question of setting up genuine permanent institutions with a view to economic integration.

The Long Term

While supporting the principle of unity and the OAU secretary general's approach, the chiefs of state do not seem willing to go all the way with his statements. Even less do they seem prepared to adopt the recommended means of implementation. Perhaps because they are not willing to face the budgetary consequences—that is, to finance the operations that must come about as a result. Unless they have not all understood the importance of what is at stake. But the Lagos statement, owing to the realism of its approach and the noble philosophy underlying it, not to mention the objectives it assigns to the Africans, is of capital importance. Like any project which will not bear fruit except over the long term, this one will only be as good as those in charge of sustaining it, heading it up, and putting it into effect. It is true that few African leaders are seriously interested in the long term. Perhaps because in the long term we will all be dead.

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Two Years of Effort

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 p 25

[Article by S.A.]

[Text] "I accuse you journalists of being interested only in the spectacular and in politics. Instead of attacking me on the subject of the Sahara or Chad, ask me questions about the African economy! Ask yourselves where we are going!" One year after his election as secretary general of the OAU, Edem Kodjo directed that vehement protest at us (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 966).

At the time, Kodjo still seemed to be crying in the wilderness. Few Africans (including some among the leaders) understood that new language, which was centered so resolutely on the economy and which seemingly relegated the OAU's political problems to the background. But on the very day of his election (on 22 July 1978, during the 15th summit meeting in Khartoum), Edem Kodjo had warned us (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 919-920): "We are winding up decolonization: Namibia and Zimbabwe will be independent within 2 years. Only the South African bastion will then remain. And that bastion is an economic power that we cannot combat effectively unless we build economic power for ourselves."

For a full 2 years, the OAU secretary general was to visit the African capitals with that "gospel." It was necessary in order to convince the chiefs of state, who were divided among theses that were socialist only in their verbosity and other theses that were liberal only because they had raised laxity to the state of an economic system. At worst, the African leaders resisted anything smacking of economics, while at best they had their own theories as to what the African economy should be.

Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal envisioned Africa as being organized into regional "concentric circles" that would gradually merge into continental solidarity. Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Omar Bongo of Gabon stuck with the traditional Africa as an exporter of raw materials for industry. For his part, Edem Kodjo was proposing an immediate African common market: let Africa trade with Africa. Let those who have meat and millet sell them to those who have cement or petroleum. Paradoxically, the man who was said to have been the candidate supported by the "moderate" French-speaking states found his best support among the English speakers and the "progressives." Sensitive to his talk about self-sufficiency in food, Tanzanian Julius Nyerere and Mozambican Samora Machel supported him among their peers.

But it was also necessary to identify all the projects that would serve as the foundation for that economic Africa. This meant that experts were necessary, with as many Africans among them as could be found. Edem Kodjo set out to find them in—and even lure them away from—African universities and government administrations. Economists from Morocco or Benin, engineers

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from Madagascar or Senegal, Cameroonian mathematicians or Malian financiers, and Algerian or Nigerian petroleum experts in fact set up a sort of lobby on the continental scale. In February 1979, during the symposium of experts held in Monrovia, Africa discovered for the first time in the OAU's history that it had "experts."

One year later, the action plan drawn up by Kodjo's team has received endorsement from the special summit meeting in Lagos. The first step has been accomplished: a number of African chiefs of state have realized that the survival of Africa—and of the African states—is at stake. The others understand (at least secretly) that from now on their continuation in power depends on the economic viability of their countries.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DIFFICULTIES OF 'DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE' DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 pp 54-56

[Article by Jacques Vignes]

[Text] Last 2 April in Paris, the personnel at the magazine DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE decided to go on strike for 48 hours, with the possibility of staying out longer, as a protest against the nonpayment of March wages. The news was reported on the 3rd by the Ivorian newspaper FRATERNITE-MATIN, which added, "Serious doubts exist as to the periodical's future because of its serious financial problems, which the present management does not seem capable of solving." In Paris on the 4th, LE MONDE also published the report, as did LIBERATION, while the magazine's personnel decided to stay out on strike.

Loans or Gifts?

On the 5th, the warning signs grew clearer. According to an AFP dispatch dated that same day, the decision to halt or continue publication would be made public on 19 April. But things went wrong as early as the 9th. A press release announced that PEPA (Pan-African Publishing, Press, and Audiovisual Company), the company that publishes DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, was filing for bankruptcy. Its action was said to have been made inevitable "by misappropriations in the management of funds." A suit charging "swindling, embezzlement, and fraudulent misuse of funds and company assets" was also filed against "Paul Bernetel and his accomplices." Paul Bernetel is the magazine's general manager. He is still listed as such in the latest issue--No 50, dated 7 April. The press release was signed by Mory Diakite, chairman and managing director of SOCEP [Publishing and Press Company].

At this point an explanation is in order. SOCEP is a company operating under Senegalese law with headquarters in Dakar. It owns almost all the shares in PEPA, Incorporated, a company operating under French law with headquarters in Paris. SOCEP plays the role of a financing company with respect to PEPA. It is SOCEP which has provided the magazine with funds since the latter's establishment. Its directors, in addition to Bernetel and Kabue Buana as representatives of DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, are influential Gabonese, Ivorians, and Zaireans.

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Let us say here for the record that no one knows where the money comes from (and as we will see, it adds up to a lot of money). Who makes it available to the financing company so that the latter, in turn, can pass it on to the publishing company? Is it a matter of gifts? Of loans? With or without interest? Are the donors (or lenders) governments or companies? Which ones?

Unfortunately, that aspect—a very important one for the magazine's independence and credibility—has always been shrouded in mystery. And this has undoubtedly contributed more than a little to the tendency by the company's managers to squander money which, from all appearances, would not have to be repaid. And in any case, the money is gone now.

## Board of Directors

As will be seen below, we know how much the DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE misadventure will have cost to date (nearly 1 billion CFA francs, or 20 million French francs) when the suppliers and employees have been paid off, but we do not yet know and may never know whom it cost.

But let us get back to the events that took place in April.

On 10 April, FRATERNITE-MATIN printed in substance the press release signed by Diakite. But on the 11th, that newspaper published a clarification by Bernetel, in which we read: "That action (Editor's note: the lawsuit) could only have originated in a personal desire to harm me. In any case, it did not originate with SOCEP's board of directors, of which I am a member, since the board never had the matter before it and therefore did not mandate anything. A board meeting in the near future should make it possible to determine who is responsible for the action in question. For that purpose, I have requested that a special meeting be called as soon as possible."

## Unanimity?

FRATERNITE-MATIN concludes by saying that those two releases "prove, at the very least, that serious internal problems exist within that periodical, and we hope that its 'disappearance' is only temporary." On the llth, there was another telex from the AFP concerning what is becoming "the DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE affair." It announced the filing of bankruptcy by PEPA and the decision by the personnel to continue the strike, and then went on to quote a passage from a statement by the interunion organization, which has the merit of clearly situating the debate.

The telex says that the filing of bankruptcy "constitutes one consequence of a type of management that was carried on contrary to common sense until the last minute. It sacrificed the future of a magazine whose objective had been to be one of Africa's major voices and one of the architects of continental unity." On the 18th, Saleh Kebzabo, editorial manager of DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE (since Issue No 46, dated 11 February 1980), published an open letter in which he stated in particular: "Since its establishment, DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE

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has been poorly managed through incompetence or carelessness or both. What is worse, the funds intended for the magazine have been squandered for personal ends."

Lastly, on the 23rd, a manifesto signed by about 30 of the magazine's contributors protested the attempts to make the financial crisis look like a political crisis and refuted the argument that refusal by SOCEP's board of directors to make more funds available to PEPA was a ploy aimed at eliminating the magazine's manager (Paul Bernetel).

The signers said in their manifesto: "There is no proof of any of that. On the contrary, the directors are completely unanimous. And it is their unanimity which, in reaction to Paul Bernetel's dangerous agitations, has led them to declare themselves in favor of filing for bankruptcy.... That is the only truth, in its brutal nakedness. All the rest is only unfounded supposition."

The manifesto had said before that: "Cash problems began to appear as early as July 1979. It should be noted that as far back as 1978, general management was requested to schedule an audit, but for various reasons, management delayed the audit until July 1979. It was then that an analysis of management and the audit revealed very serious irregularities in the use of the funds that had been placed in full confidence at the general manager's disposal."

Where Is the Rest of the Money?

Those are the essentials of the facts made known to that point to a limited public. They were disturbing facts, certainly, but they remained sufficiently vague to allow doubts to persist. In the midst of accusations of plots on the one hand and accusations of embezzling on the other, there was room for a number of questions. To clarify the matter, it was necessary to get to the bottom of things and try to determine the reasons why SOCEP twisted the neck of PEPA, its subsidiary, although with the possibility of reviving it later.

Fortunately, there exists a document making it possible to see the matter very clearly. That document is the minutes of the special meeting by SOCEP's board of directors, dated 8 January 1980 and signed by all of the company's directors, including Paul Bernetel and Kabue Buana, DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE's representatives.

It makes instructive reading. Judge from this: in it we learn that since September 1977, the date on which the magazine was established (in other words, over the past 28 months), PEPA has had the sum of 15,748,705 French francs, or nearly 1.6 billion centimes (800 million CFA francs), placed at its disposal. Of that total, PEPA actually received only 12,090,408.70 French francs. That leaves a difference of 3,658,290.30 French francs (183 million CFA francs).

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What happened to the difference, which disappeared somewhere between Dakar and Paris? According to the minutes of the board of directors meeting, 1.35 million French francs (67.5 million CFA francs) were paid to filmmaker Med Hondo for his film "West Indies." This was allegedly done on the initiative of the general manager (Paul Bernetel), who supposedly acted without the agreement of his board of directors. As far as the rest of the money is concerned, Paul Bernetel is said to have signed an acknowledgement of the debt. But the suit filed on 8 April with the senior examining magistrate and then with the Paris Court of Great Instance through attorney Jean-Serge Lorach takes no notice of those subtle distinctions. The amount listed in the complaint totals 3,448,187 French francs.

The complaint says, "SOCEP examined all the checks drawn on its account and determined that Paul Bernetel, its managing director in France, had withdrawn the difference for his personal needs or for the benefit of enterprises in which he had a direct or indirect interest."

That aspect of the case, which is before the courts, is not the only one posing a problem. What would have happened, for example, if DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE had received an additional 3.5 million French francs? The magazine would simply have enjoyed a "stay of execution." Its monthly revenues (sales plus advertising) were averaging 800,000 French francs (44 million CFA francs). But expenditures were running at 1.25 million French francs, for a chronic deficit on the order of 400,000 French francs (20 million CFA francs) per month (nearly 5 million French francs or 250 million CFA francs per year). This meant that new injections of capital were constantly necessary. Money poured through it like water through a sieve.

And the worst part is that the massive losses could have been stopped. The only thing needed was some slight degree of tight management. But a plethora of personnel and laxity in the matter of expense accounts were the gangrene that nibbled away at the system. The magazine started with 13 employees. Two years later it had 47, plus about 20 more or less permanent freelancers. It is true that in that period it changed from a monthly to a semimonthly magazine, but the one does not justify the other.

What To Do?

Travel expenses alone amounted to about 180,000 French francs (9 million CFA francs) per month, or nearly 10 times the amount that should have been necessary. One of the magazine's contributors told us, with perhaps a tinge of regret in his voice, that "DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE was the Club Mediterranee." It is not every day that one can enjoy so much generosity in one's job.

Mory Diakite, SOCEP's chairman and general manager, throws up his hands: "What could anyone do with such a mess? I had no choice except to file for bankruptcy and initiate a lawsuit." And when asked why the financial backers did not react sooner to the deteriorating situation, he answered, "We had confidence. We had drawn up a financing plan through the end of 1979. We

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all had numerous other preoccupations. We were scattered all over the world. We did not imagine that we could be fooled."

Keep Hoping!

A mess! The word has been spoken. And it sums up very well the reasons for the uneasiness one feels on looking into this affair. What! A press enterprise that enjoyed from the start an exceptionally solid financial base—one that was even too generous in terms of the goal in mind. That much money is not needed to start a monthly magazine, and no one, anywhere, has ever had that much. Here is a magazine successful in finding readers (its print run amounted to about 50,000 copies, with sales of around 30,000 copies) and enjoying considerable advertising revenues. Its editorial team has talent. And what is the result? The deplorable fiasco we have just described.

One cannot help reacting against such a waste of funds. Especially in the case of an African magazine which chose the praiseworthy mission of enriching the means of information available to Africa and which, for that purpose, used funds from the poorest continent in the world. Such a calling unquestionably called for a certain amount of austerity! But look what happened instead.

But there remains a buildup of not inconsiderable resources: experience, a reputation, readers, subscribers, and advertisers—in short, everything that goes to make up the "invisible" but irreplaceable capital of a press medium. That capital can still be saved. Some people are considering it. But there is a heavy handicap to be overcome. Let us hope, however, that in the interest of all the African press, DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE will rise from its ashes. But without the mess!

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SUMMARY OF UNDP REPORT FOR NAIROBI TECHNICAL COOPERATION CONFERENCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 May 80 pp 1136-39

[Article: "Science and Technology Serving Development in Africa"]

[Text] The conference of African government experts on technical cooperation between African countries is being held in Nairobi from 12-20 May in the framework of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and under the aegis of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of the United Nations. The goal of the conference is essentially to encourage the exchange of information between African countries, to spread knowledge of data from useful experiments, and to set forth the positive or negative results of development efforts in Africa in three areas: rural development, the transformation and marketing of foodstuffs, and science and technology in service to development.

A Rich But Underdeveloped Continent

With a total area of about 30.3 million square km, Africa has between 20 and 25 percent of the world's land area. At present, only 7 percent of that area is arable land, but half of the total area of Africa could be cultivated.

The population of Africa grew from about 270 million in 1960 to about 410 million in 1975: its annual rate of increase (nearly 3 percent) is the highest in the world. This population will probably reach 470 million in 1980 and 550 million in 1985, but it is still not very dense and lives in widely dispersed centers. Its density ranges from 1 to 470 people per square km, considering the total area, and from 25 to 1,200 people per square km, considering the arable area.

Africa possesses vast mineral resources, which makes it one of the richest areas in the world. Its land contains 96 percent of the world's diamonds, 90 percent of the chrome, about 50 percent of the cobalt, 10 percent of the iron ore, 55 percent of the manganese, 40 percent of the bauxite, 20 percent of the copper, 50 percent of the phosphates, 30 percent of the thorium and uranium and about 50 percent of the gold. Its share in world production is about 26 percent for cobalt ore, 81 percent for gold, 74 percent for diamonds, 26 percent for phosphates, 19 percent for copper ore, and about 7 percent for iron ore. The development of many countries in Africa will remain dependent for a long time yet on mineral resources, although this development cannot

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be achieved without the general use of science and technology.

Africa also possesses abundant energy resources, but they are still partly undeveloped, like the minerals. At present, only 10 countries in Africa produce crude oil, but constant prospecting for oil deposits on the continent may reveal the existence of oil in more countries. Africa also has many other energy resources: coal and solar, geothermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear energy. It is estimated that Africa has about 1.3 percent of the world's coal reserves and from 27 to 40 percent of the world's potential hydroelectric power.

The general secretary's staff of the United Nations Program for Development drew up a general report for use as a working document for the Nairobi conference of African governmental experts.

It notes first that the last 20 years of the post-colonial political independence period have not brought about the expected radical economic transformation because most of the countries have adopted negative development strategies. Despite Africa's vast natural resources and the laudable efforts of its governments and people, it shows no notable growth rate or satisfactory increase in general well-being. Its economy remains essentially underdeveloped.

An African Strategy for Development

The report then restates the guiding principles of African development strategy, which are defined by the member states of the Economic Commission for Africa:

Although trade with countries on other continents is important, as is private aid and investment, these factors cannot alone bring about the desirable, timely, and basic economic and social change that autonomous economic growth and development depends on, in terms of both resources and function.

A conscious effort must be made at the national, multinational, and regional levels to plan, begin, activate, and direct these processes.

Autonomy in terms of resources implies that imports must be gradually replaced by production from the economic and social system.

Functional autonomy demands that the interplay of supply and demand, which determines the direction and rate of development, economic growth, and the structure of production, consumption, and investment, apply in every country and that the economic and social structures be conceived in such a way that the different elements mutually support and reinforce one another.

Autonomy in terms of resources as well as function requires that the people participate effectively and massively in the production and distribution of the social product.

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This strategy is to be the basis for the scientific and technological activity of the 1980's to complete the system of technical cooperation for the benefit of collective autonomy in Africa,

In recent years, many African countries have made progress in developing and planning scientific and technical policy. In the last decade, the conceptual framework of this policy has evolved: the countries of Africa (especially Egypt, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Cameroon, Tanzania, the Sudan, and Zambia) were at first anxious to apply resources to basic research, and they came to recognize the importance of science and technology to their national plans for general development.

The Means of Development Research

The UNDP general secretary staff's report deals with the means of development research:

- (a) Most African countries have two or three times fewer researchers, engineers, and technicians per million inhabitants than the countries of Asia and 30 times fewer than European countries.
- (b) Only a few African countries have achieved the UN objective for the second decade of development as set by the World Action Plan: 200 researchers per million inhabitants in 1980 (380 for Asia and 400 for Latin America). In 1967, almost all the European countries had 1,000 researchers per million inhabitants, and this number has increased considerably since then. The African countries that have reached or are close to the objective are Egypt (500), Ghana (474), Tunisia (257), Senegal (221), Mauritius (219), Kenya (143), the Ivory Coast (125), Libya (85), and the Central African Republic (71). Foreigners are sometimes included in these figures, and in some countries they account for as much as 70 percent of the corps of researchers and engineers.
- (c) A large proportion of researchers and engineers are employed part-time (48 percent on the average). Most researchers and engineers are in the natural sciences (37 percent) and agriculture (33 percent), while the mechanical and electrical industries, which are an important sector, have only 9 percent of the total.
- (d) Higher education is the greatest employer of researchers and engineers engaged in research and development (55 percent of the total). The production sector employs 36 percent and the service sector, only 9 percent,

Most African countries have not met the objective set by the United Nations of devoting 0.5 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to research and development.

Projects Under Study or Under Way

Various projects are presently in the study stage or have been undertaken in Africa.

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A large number of countries have shown great interest in using solar power for various purposes: pumping water for domestic use and irrigating small plots, cooking food, evaporative processes, distilling water, etc. The first solar pump in Africa was installed in the Dakar Meteorological Physics Institute in 1968. Similar pumps are presently at work in Algeria, Egypt, Upper Volta, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon, in the Sudan, and Chad, and others are being installed in Cape Verde, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Rwanda.

The Office of Solar Energy of Niger (ONERSOL), which was created about 12 years ago, the Institute of Solar Energy and Research Applied to the Environment (ISERER) in the Sudan, and the Solar Energy Laboratory in Bamako, Mali have already produced several trial products of interest in the application of solar energy: water heaters, distilleries, etc. ONERSOL, with the collaboration of the West German Spilling company, has built a prototype solar engine that produces mechanical energy and is marketed under the name Onersol, as well as an experimental solar kiln for ceramics. The Rwandan Center for Energy Studies and Applications also has an applied research program that deals with such machines as solar refrigerators and biodegraders.

The Inter-African Commission of Hydraulic Studies of Upper Volta has a research program on the production of biogases. For more than 20 years, a private company, Fort Ternan, has been making biodegraders in Kenya. These installations produce not only methane gas but also excellent fertilizer. The Coffee Research Foundation of Kenya has demonstrated scientifically the high quality of the mud used as fertilizer.

Attempts have also been made to use wind power, especially for pumping water for domestic use and for irrigating small plots. Pilot experiments and experiments under working conditions are being carried out in many countries. In Senegal, the physics group of the Polytechnical School of Thies is working on generators run on wind energy and having a theoretical 13-15 horsepower. The object is to see what problems are posed by the different kinds of machines already developed and what their solutions are.

Experiments on the aerodynamics of wind machines and the construction of new kinds of wind machines are being carried out in Ougadougou, Upper Volta. Attempts are also being made to improve the effectiveness of wind machines by overcoming such difficulties as the stalling of vanes by a violent wind, the optimal adjustment of vanes, better operation in light winds, and increased resistance to high winds. Locally built wind machines have been installed in several countries, notably Ethiopia, Upper Volta, Mali, Tanzania, and Senegal. Cape Verde produces wind machines industrially.

In the Ivory Coast and Nigeria, several research projects are in progress in the agricultural production sector. A lot of work has been done in agronomical research to improve certain varieties of cereals and to study cultivation methods apt to improve productivity. Attempts are being made to improve local varieties by experimenting with hybrid plants adaptable to local economic and climatic conditions. Fertilizers and other materials for increasing productivity are also being tried out.

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Research and development projects in housing, water, energy, agricultural and manufacturing industries are in progress in Botswana, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, Senegal, and Zambia. In Nigeria, the Federal Institute for Industrial Research has encouraged the construction of a treatment plant for gari (a cassava product) using new local techniques. This project included basic research, quality improvement, and industrial production.

The Tanzanian Organization for the Development of Small Industry (SIDO) has launched some projects intended to develop and make known techniques appropriate to rural and small industries mainly in the areas of food production, construction materials and clay-based products, textiles and clothing, and a rural mechanics workshop.

The Center for Technical Consultative Services of the Technical and Scientific University of Kumasi, Ghana is cooperating in the work of research and development by furnishing technical know-how and participating in the trial of new products in pilot plants. It is also concerned with the technical aspects of production, the possibilities of obtaining credit, and the improvement of materials. The Center for Applied Technology in Botswana and the Consulting Group for Technological Development at the University of Zambia are carrying out similar activities.

It is also acknowledged that the lack of qualified personnel and the shortcomings of the educational system in Africa are the most serious obstacles to development. Serious efforts are being made, especially in technical training. Many university exchanges are being made between nations (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Zambia, Cameroon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Upper Volta, Kenya, Togo, Mali, Tanzania, Burundi, Benin, Mauritius, Egypt, Tunisia, Gabon, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, the Sudan, Zaire, and Madagascar).

Industrial Organization and Promotion

Industrial organization and promotion are the basis of African development. In 1972, Africa's share in world manufacturing was only 0.6 percent, and its share in the production from developing countries was less than 10 percent. African manufacturing production is divided into non-durable consumer goods, about 70 percent; intermediary goods, 15-16 percent; and capital equipment, broadly speaking, 14-15 percent.

Many African countries are working increasingly at developing some areas of heavy industry--cement, non-metal products, fertilizer and other chemical products, especially--and are already making some metal products, such as table and kitchen utensils, tools and simple instruments, or are proceeding to produce transportation equipment, refrigeration units and other electrical machinery, essentially with the help of imports.

Imports intended for the manufacturing sector include especially intermediary goods that have not yet reached the stage of final production in African industry. Of course, Africa produces a whole range of raw materials that

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are used in making many intermediary goods that are all used in the continent's manufacturing industries. Many African countries are importing from outside Africa increasing amounts of intermediary products that are sometimes made with raw materials of African origin. Africa is generally a net importer of shoe leather, wood pulp for paper, nonferrous metal products, tanning materials for leather, textile dyes, etc.

At the same time, Africa is a net exporter of leather and hides, lumber, nonferrous base metals (especially copper, tin, zinc, lead, and aluminum), pigments, indigo, coal-tar dyes and other products for tanning and dyeing, all of which are used to make imported intermediate goods. These goods could be produced locally with local materials partly to supply expanding industries and party for export at a better price than they get as raw materials. It is equally evident that intraregional trade in these products is very limited, which explains to some extent the lack of coordinated development of African manufacturing industries.

Some of the Africa promotion organizations are:

Tanzania: the Small Industries Promotion Office contributes to the establishment of especially viable industries, such as artisanal sugar-making, artisanal oil extraction, fruit and vegetable conservation, clay tile and brick production, and paper products and paper manufacturing.

Botswana: the Botswana Business Development Service (BEDU) promotes the formation of local businesses by making workshops and industrial plants available to them.

Senegal: the National Society for Industrial Study and Promotion (SONEPIL) has had the task since 1956 of supervising the formation of small and medium businesses in various parts of the country and managing industrial parks (Dakar, Thies, Saint-Louis, Kaolack, and Ziguinchor).

Mauritius: the Mauritian Sugar Industry Research Institute (MSIRI) gives African countries access to its techniques for maximizing production, processing sugar, and training personnel.

Nigeria: the Nigerian Palm Oil Research Institute takes trainees from other African countries that produce palm oil and initiates them in cultivation, processing, and marketing methods.

The aforementioned UNDP also lists other efforts at industrial promotion: cattle raising in Botswana, shoe leather in Tunisia, vineyards in Tunisia, minerals in Burundi and Benin, industrial study and planning in Egypt, an industrial technology school on Mauritius, and a Center for Industrial Information and Technology in Ghana.

Rural Technology

Concerning rural technology, the report mentions the manufacture of light agricultural equipment in Kenya, Upper Volta, Uganda, Swaziland, and Tanzania, which have benefited from pertinent research. The same is true in Upper Volta, where a project for using plastics  $i_0$  rural development is in progress.

Other research and development projects are being carried out in the field of energy resources:

Ghana: development of forest energy resources; Kenya: a geothermal electric power plant; Mauritius: maximum use of water power; Ethiopia: water pumping in rural areas; Cape Verde: water pumping by wind power; Mali: practical application of research by the Solar Energy

Mali: practical application of research by the Solar Energy Laboratory; Rwanda: development of solar distilleries by the Center for Solar Energy Applications and Study;

Upper Volta: projects by the Inter-African Committee for Hydraulic Studies.

In addition, various scientific and technological projects based on problems important to Africa are benefiting from international aid and assistance, especially in the Sahel Institute's struggle against drought and the battle with desertification, which involves introducing the jojoba bean into the Sudan. The jojoba originates in the Sonora desert of northwestern Mexico and in the neighboring arid regions of the southwestern United States and has miraculous powers. It can be used to conserve soil, fight desertification, and especially to replace whale oil used in industry because of the oil that can be extracted from its seeds.

Likewise, the Malagasy Innovation Institute (IMI) was created in September 1979 to contribute to the country's economic development by adopting innovative and unconventional methods in solving its problems. Its action should enable Madagascar not only to reach the technical level of developed countries but also to avoid some mistakes that the developed countries have made, such as pollution, dehumanization, etc.

In Tanzania, a technology for storing cereals has been evolved, and in Zambia an easy way of storing corn after harvest has been found.

African Experiments in Technical Cooperation Between Developing Countries

The desire for cooperation between African countries is attested to by the existence of a hundred organizations, unions, communities, committees, and associations.

In West and Central Africa as well as in East Africa, economic cooperation started with independence and in parallel to political cooperation. And though, for example, Guinea has not joined French-language organizations, it immediately engaged in economic cooperation with Ghana to the extent that a total union could be proposed. In North Africa, and more especially the Maghreb, economic cooperation was slow in getting started if it is dated from the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956. That is not at all true if it is dated from the independence of Algeria in 1962. When the whole Maghreb became independent, economic cooperation became the order of the day. The same thing happened in the Nile valley between Egypt and the Sudan when the Sudan became independent. The necessity for economic cooperation seems to

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become apparent to African countries as they have become independent. The effects of this realization can be seen in the constituent texts of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and its instutional expression in the organizations created.

Many programs are being studied or implemented, often with the financial and technical assistance of international organizations. Among the technical cooperation projects between developing African countries can be noted especially:

English-language East Africa: training of dairy personnel under the aegis of the FAO and the host governments.

Sub-Saharan Africa: training of acquaculture specialists under the aegis of the FAO.

Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Senegal: development of mass information for rural development, under the aegis of UNESCO.

Equatorial zone: training of rural leaders under the aegis of UNESCO.

Ghana: training of agronomy teachers under the aegis of UNESCO.

Mali: training of mid-level agricultural technical personnel for the Sahel countries, under the aegis of UNESCO.

Kenya, Mauritania, Senegal, Ethiopia, Somalia: research and training under the aegis of UNESCO and the FAO.

Senegal and the Ivory Coast: training of family economy technicians and agricultural specialists under the aegis of UNESCO.

Ethiopia: training of agricultural technicians under the aegis of UNESCO.

Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Kenya, Lesotho: mechanizing agriculture with a light, locally-produced tractor.

Niger: basic and applied research in solar energy.

Benin, Burundi, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Tunisia, Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Somalia, Tanzania: planning and administration of special public-works programs under the aegis of the International Labor Office (ILO).

Tanzania: artisanal production of agricultural implements; assistance to industrial cooperatives, under the aegis of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Chad and Burundi: making pharmaceutical products from local medicinal herbs under the aegis of UNIDO.

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Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Upper Volta, Senegal, Chad, Nigeria: development of the millet and sorghum food industries in a common society, SADIAMIL.

Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Comero Islands: development of mineral resources.

West Africa: development of rice growing in the 15 countries involved, and studies of storage, processing cereals, fruits and vegetables, and meat and fish, under the aegis of UNIDO, the UNDP, and the FAO.

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BURUNDI

ANNUAL VARIATION OF COFFEE PRODUCTION AFFECTS MONEY SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1105

[Text] Burundi's economy is totally dominated by coffee, representing in value over '90 percent of its total exports.

The production of green coffee in the period 1978-1979 was estimated at 22,000 tons, thus recovering its best levels (21,400 tons in the period 1976-1977), but as the prices obtained declined on the average by 50 percent, the income derived by export will not exceed for 1980, a volume of 5.3 billion Burundi france (1 F Bu = approximately 0.05 French franc) as compared with 7.6 billion in 1979.

For the 1978-1979 period, the total revenue distributed to coffee producers will be about 2.5 billion F Bu, contributing to the maintenance of the purchase power of the rural masses.

Under the double burden of the decline in the exports and the increases in the imports because of the rise in cost of oil products, the trade position is unbalanced, showing a 3 billion F Bu deficit as compared to a 1.4 billion surplus in 1978.

From the monetary point of view, the annual variation of coffee production and the receipts of foreign exchange resulting from export affect the evolution of the monetary mass and its counterparts. From 1975 to 1978, this evolution was manifested in the manner summed up below (in millions of FBu)

	1975	1976	1977	1978
Bills and coins in circulation	- 163.7	+ 701.2	+ 813.9	+1,318.8
Sight and term bank deposits	+ 102.2	+ 974.8	+2,248.9	- 190.8
Total money mass	- 61.5	+1,676.	+3,062.8	+1,128.
Debt from abroad	+1,057.9	+1,681.7	+3,924.1	-1,547.9
Debt on the State	+ 321.2	- 109.6	- 937.8	+1,158.2
Debt on the economy	-1,461.	+ 498.2	+ 354.7	+2,604.4

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The sudden reversal in the circumstances observed in 1978 is due to the deterioration in the terms of exchange. Moreover, Burundi's economy is exposed to different stresses: insufficient fluidity of the supply related to the country being hemmed in, and the mediocrity of the internal means of communication, deficiency of the marketing circuits and defective control system for the internal prices.

The short term prospects of the Burundi economy remain bound with the evolution of the sales price of coffee and the increase in the cost of supplies.

Furthermore the conflict which occurred between Tanzania and Yuganda did not fail to affect seriously Burundi's supplies, by blocking the only two means of communication, by land and lake, providing the access to the ports of the Indian Ocean. Such a situation, if prolonged could endanger the implementation of the Third Development Plan. It might even prevent normal transportation of the coffee crop.

As for the internal situation, the costs have suffered, and continue to suffer from considerable pressures, pressures maintained both by the high level of the imported goods and by the increase in the revenues of the agricultural producers. That is why the public authorities are now faced with a problem which threatens to weaken the chances of development of the country.

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BURUNDI

#### DEVELOPMENT OF NICKEL PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 992

[Text] According to the report for the 1979 financial year, the Banque Belge-Zairoise (Belgolaise) presented to the General Assembly on 23 April last, Burundi may hope to develop its nickel production.

The bank noted that the Burundi economy, bound mainly to coffee, benefited in 1979 from a favorable crop reaching 24,318 tons of commercial Arabica coffee, 16 percent more than last year. Fairly favorable world prices made it possible to sign sales contracts which will bring in about \$94 millions to this country. These relatively high commercial receipts limited the effect of the extra costs of the imports and the impact of the latter on foreign exchange reserves which are maintained at a satisfactory level.

An air bridge organized from Bujumbura at the end of May permitted the partial release of the port of Dar es Salaam where the situation subsequently improved progressively.

In the sector of mining prospections, the study of the nickel deposits of the region of Musongati was carried out on the initiative of the United Nations' Development Program (UNPD). The report established confirms that it is possible to set up extraction and refining industries. The annual capacity of production and export would reach about 30,000 tons of ferronickel, also a certain amount of copper and cobalt. The most extensive deposit in Buhinda would permit operating at this level for about 20 years.

Belgolaise recalls that the signature of another contract for cooperation between Belgium and Burundi for the period 1980 to 1984 was announced at the end of November 1978. The Belgian aid would amount to about 5 billion Belgian francs altogether, including about 1 billion FB for 1980.

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BURUNDI

#### BRIEFS

BUJUMBURA CREDIT BANK--During the 1979 financial year, the Bujumbura Credit Bank increased its contribution to the financing of Burundi's economic activity. The rise in the short term credits allowed by the banking system was 49 percent for import credits and 30 percent for export facilities. The deposits of the customers of the commercial bands gave a 14 percent increase for the year. On 31 December 1979, the total balance of the Bank was 2.7 billion Burundi france (1 F Bu = 0.05 French franc). The deposits and current accounts of the clients, on sight or on term amounted to 1.8 billion; meanwhile, the investments (portfolio of commercial assets and advances) represented 2.2 billion. Outside the budget, guarantees for third parties came to 0.7 billion, while commitments for debtors amounted to 0.8 billion. After amortisements, provisions and taxes, the 1979 financial year balance sheet gave a net result of 0.8 billion, for which the General Assembly of 26 March 1980 gave a dividend of 18.375 percent for a 100 million capital along with 66 million miscellaneous reserves.. The president of the Bujumbura Credit Bank is Mr Jacques Verdickt and Mr Michel Lambin acts as general manager as Deputy Administrator. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1105] 9018

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CAMEROON

TRADE WITH BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG ECONOMIC UNION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1098

[Text] In 1978, the exports of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union [UEBL] to the Cameroon had increased by 24.7 percent while the Cameroon exports had risen by only 9 percent, as indicated on 25 April by the Belgian Foreign Trade Bureau. Thus the UBL deficit in its trade with the Cameroon had dropped by 81.6 million Belgian francs (855.7 million as compared with 774.1 million).

On the other hand in 1979, for the first 10 months of the year, the UEBL exports dropped by 17 percent (542.7 million as compared with 654 million Belgian francs in 1978) while the Cameroon exports rose by over 56 percent (968.9 against 618.3 million): the deficit is already reaching 426 million.

The increase in the Cameroon sales is found in many sectors, but the most important is that of wood (70 percent of the total). One must now also add crude oils which represent for the first 10 months, 27.6 million Belgian francs.

As for the Belgian exports, the greatest reduction may be found in the sector of fertilizers (although the Socame plant has not resumed its operation), but there has been a regression also for machinery and transport equipment. On the other hand, there was progress in manufactured articles and are at the head of Belgian sales to the Cameroon; food products have also improved their position.

In 1978, the UEBL retained its eighth place among Cameroon suppliers, with 2.3 percent of the total imports as compared with 2.2 in 1977. As for the imports from the Cameroon, in 1978, they bring the Union to seventh position among the countries buying Cameroon products with 2.6 percent of the total as compared with 2.5 in 1977.

In 1978, the Cameroon rose from position 75 to 72 on the list of UBEL customers and from number 65 to 63 of its suppliers.

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CAMEROON

NO REAL PROGRESS NOTED IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1098

[Text] No characteristic evolution of the Cameroon industrial sector was noted during the third quarter of 1979. In one year, the figures increased at the same rate as the inflation of the money: in other words, there was no real progress. Still within the year, the persons employed by the members of the Syndustricam increased by 1,000 (if for no other reason than new members joining the Syndicate) to achieve the total figure of 28,013 workers; during the same period, the total amount of salary earned rose by 18 percent, that is, 13.0 percent per person employed; this last rate corresponds approximately to that of the increase of the cost of living. Now during this period (September 1978 to September 1979) the government did not decree any increase in salaries; this average increase of 13.9 percent per worker means that the companies granted raises of their own accord.

The exports to UDEAC Chad have begun to decline, for the RCA [Central African Region], and especially Chad have not recovered their stability. On the other hand large scale exports, especially to industrialized countries have increased by 20 percent in current terms. What were the branches which made particular progress in the area of large scale exports? Textiles, printing equipment, plastic, aluminum. On the other hand, the sectors most affected in the export are Figuil cement which no longer goes to Chad, transformation of ferrous metals, clothing.

It is true that if we consider the business turnover including all taxes, no recession is observed in current francs, except for clothing. On the other hand we may note considerable progress, sometimes coming from a new member. Thus, the sector of electricity and electronics increased by 59 percent in one year, the "shoe-leather goods" sector by 65 percent (no doubt because of the starting of the Societe des Tanneries et Peausseries du Cameroun-STPC of Ngaoundere), beverages by 29 percent (causing the creation of new brewery plants) and the sector on nonmetal mineral products by 27 percent owing to the continued progress of the cement industry, which is soon to undergo expansion.

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It may finally be noted that the trunover for internal trade has certainly progressed in constant terms, since it increased by 17 percent, which proves once again the importance of the internal market for the companies set up in the Cameroon, as had already been emphasized by the article on the results of the industry in 1978-1979 published in the MARCHES TROPICAUX of 4 Jan 80 (p 29).

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CAMEROON

## BRIEFS

LNG PLANT—The Total-Mobil Oil partnership has become the "technical assistant" for the combined group of the Cameroon oil companies and the Societe nationale des hydrocarbures [National Hydrocarbon Company] (SNH—a State enterprise) which is to build a naturel gas liquefaction plant in Kribi. It was on 18 March last that the companies ELF-Erop, Coast Oil, Mobil Oil, Shell and Total agreed to work together and operate as soon as possible the gas reserves in the Cameroon. Preliminary studies will be carried out immediately to be completed by December 1982. They will be followed by the construction of the gas liquefaction plant which will be operational by 1987. All the operations will be coordinated by SNH. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, in French 9 May 80 p 1098] 9018

DUTCH AID FOR ROADS—A financing agreement for 18 million CFA francs meant for the building of the Douala-Yaounde highway was signed on April 29 between the Dutch ambassador, Mr Abraham Schneiders and the Cameroon deputy minister of Economics and Planning, Mr Pierre Desire Engo. The Dutch financial participation will permit building section number 3 of the road which is to join the two Cameroon capitals, Douala (economic) and Yaounde (political) at a distance of 275 km from each other. During this ceremony of the signing of the agreement, the Cameroon deputy minister indicated that the other backers would be meeting in Brussels to release the other funds needed to implement the project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1098] 9018

BELGIAN AID, LOAN--After the end of the meeting at the end of March of the mixed Belgian-Cameroon Commission an agreement covering a 5 year period was signed. The financing provided by this agreement will be 62.5 percent for the benefit of rural development, 10 percent public health, 7.5 percent for the infrastructure, 8 percent for training and study scholarships, and 12 percent for co-financing of voluntary nongovernmental organizations, associated experts and scientific support to the universities. For 1980, Belgium will grant Cameroon aid to the tune of 200 million Belgian francs, repayable in 30 years with a grace period of 10 years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1098] 9018

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COMORO ISLANDS

## BRIEFS

MARITIME SERVICE—Ships associated with Cimacorem (International Conference of Madagascar, Comoro Islands, Reunion and Mauritius) have informed shippers that despite often difficult operational conditions, they have decided to apply the same freight costs for Grande Comore (Moroni) as those used for Anjouan (Mutsamudu), beginning 15 May 1980. The equalization represents a 10.65 percent cut. The conference also announced its intent to serve the Comoran Archipelago directly by making, as often as possible, monthly calls at the ports of Dzaoudzi, Moroni and Mutsamudu. In 1979, it made 18 direct calls (seven at Dzaoudzi, four at Mutsamudu and seven at Moroni), totalling 6,000 tons. In the first 4 months of 1980, Cimacorem has already made 11 direct calls (five at Dzaoudzi, Mutsamudu and Moroni three each). [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 May 80 p 1164]

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

'CONTROLLED LIBERALISM' SEEN AS ESSENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Mar 80 pp 668-670, 671

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "After 11 Years of Lethargy. Equatorial Guinea: The Hour of Decisions"]

[Text] It was on 3 August 1979 that a carefully prepared military action brought Lt Col Obiang Nguema Basogo, then vice minister of the armed forces, to the head of Equatorial Guinea. On 4 August, the new chief of state addressed a message to King Juan Carlos expressing his wish to improve relations with Spain which, although never completely broken off, had been awkwardly strained since 1973. Almost simultaneously, an envoy from the Spanish Government disembarked at Douala, only to leave right away for Malabo. We are thus not telling secrets on Spain and Equatorial Guinea when we note, at the beginning of the new regime, this reciprocal attraction, all the livelier for having been thwarted for so long.

Even before the conventions giving a juridical framework to the cooperation with Spain were signed, the latter proffered assistance with a speed which is not always appreciated on the spot, so pressing are the needs of a country put in a state of economic siege for 11 years. It is even more remarkable when one recalls the formalities with which foreign aid is too often surrounded in Africa, especially international assistance. A grant of a billion pesetas, covering the services of 62 teachers, 40 doctors, 45 male and female nurses, financial experts, utility and liaison vehicles, food products and medicines; three bank loans totaling \$24 million in all, at advantageous interest rates and with repayment deferred, permitting the immediate opening of work sites in the areas of public works, civil aeronautics and fishing, without affecting a loan of \$2 million for the purchase of consumer goods: such are, up to now, the most important aspects of an action which is here and now visible in the field, with its cohorts of nuns in white veils and its prefabricated houses errected with joyous hammer blows along the avenues of Bata.

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Arriving on 13 December 1979 in a royal armed forces DC 8, with a retinue of 150 persons, including several ministers and high officials and 40 journalists, King Juan Carlos and Queen Sophie stamped these renewed contacts with their approval; meanwhile, two Spanish cargo ships emptied their loads of equipment and provisions, and a liner which came for the occasion, the Ciudad de Pampelona, served as a floating hotel. It was a long time, to be sure, since the facades of the cathedral and administrative buildings which surrounded the old port of Santa Isabel had witnessed such activity.

Two banquets for 200 were given—on 13 December by the president, on 15 December by the king. Everyone who matters in Equatorial Guinea was present. The president spoke of Spain, the "mother" country, but also of the budget, which is difficult to work out, of education, of health, of air, land and sea links and of telecommunications. The king, after having thanked his hosts for their invitation, replied by speaking of the Spanish heritage, the open outlook of Spain toward the rest of the world, the attention which it plans to pay to the African world, on a footing of mutual respect and perfect equality—all being remarks which Valery Giscard d'Estaing could have made, if translated into French.

A glittering start was thus given to a course which Spain broaches, if not completely as a novice, at least with an appreciable delay: a course which the industrialized countries of the West weigh, within the framework of the newly independent countries, to reconcile the requirements of their economies with the development, which is indissolubly linked with it, of their African partners. It will probably be necessary to reckon with Spain, its engineering offices and its companies in the tenders for quotation on the coast of Africa, where they are already appearing in several places. On the contrary, when the festival lights are extinguished, our Spanish friends will perhaps have to discover, to maintain their chances in a competition where no gifts are given, that the ties to be established with Africa in 1980 are not at all the same as in 1968, or even in 1973.

## Isolation and Autarky

This Spanish heritage, to which King Juan Carlos referred when disembarking at Bioco\*, is encountered by unraveling local history on the banks of beautiful Luba Bay. There a stela commemorates the fact that, on 24 October 1778, Admiral Don Felipe de Los Santos Toro, commanding a squadron composed of the frigates Santa Catalina and Nuestra Senora de la Soledad, took possession of the island in the name of Charles III, according to terms of the Treaty of Pardo by which the Portuguese ceded it to Spain.

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<sup>\*</sup>The official name henceforth of the old island of Fernando Po, renamed Macie Nguema during the ex-president's dictatorship.

The Spanish heritage is apparent in the official architecture, at once massive, elegant and highly colored, in the patios of some residences, and in the azulejos [painted glazed tiles] which sometimes adorn the walls eaten up by tropical humidity. It is still more apparent in the behavior of the upper classes. In fact, although Spain wove an invisible veil around its former possession which isolated it from the outside world and which it could only leave in the direction of the Canaries and the mother country, Spain did not at any rate economize on the educational training of African middle management, conducted in Spanish religious colleges and universities or, for military officers, at the Saragossa military academy. Intelligence, the ability to converse, a reserve quickly perceptible behind an outward sprightliness, and a total absence of pettiness are its characteristics. There is no self-serving flattery in recognizing that this type of training is in no way second to English or French models and that the human quality which results from it stands out as one in a thousand. Among the influences which have marked the African soul, and of which he intends not to deny a single one, Leopold-Sedar Senghor will have to make room for the Spanish, the presence of which he will henceforth stress at inter-African conferences. However, the Spanish heritage in Equatorial Guinea has its limits. Everywhere else in the world the Spanish language and culture are excellent tools of communication. It should be recognized that in the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, the enrichment which they bring is on equal footing with the isolation of which the Guineans are aware in terms of the closer and closer political, economic and technical ties among the states of this geographic region. Whence comes the wish shown by the new president to see his ministers and aides learn the French language rapidly, using modern methods. If Equatorial Guinea is to be the test bench and springboard of economic activity by the Spaniards in the direction of the African continent, the same efforts at adaptation will be required of them as are required of French speakers trying to acquire markets in South America.

The consciousness of the Spanish heritage, as a cultural heritage, should not thus be confused with a rejection of the surrounding area. Likewise, the reestablishment of relations between Spain and Bioco, the enclave of Rio Muni and the four inlets located off Gabon, all of which constitute the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, cannot in truth be understood as a return to the economic self-sufficiency of the colonial period. Not that the latter was without any merit. In some respects, the slight territorial importance of this last jewel of its empire had led Spain to remarkable accomplishments in the area of education and public health, especially for Rio Muni. But times have changed, and it is perhaps from not having breathed deeply enough of the new air which has blown over Africa since 1960 and from having tried, in 1968, a remote-controlled independence which would have maintained the old social and political order to a greater or lesser extent, that Spain was in the end responsible for the deplorable excesses of Macie's rule.

This is undoubtedly what Lieutenant Colonel Obiang wanted to express in his welcome to the king by an allusion, which his Spanish listeners variously appreciated, to the delays caused, in the two countries, by "the two Franciscos"\*. In reality there are two currents in these renewed Guinean—Spanish contacts. One looks to the future—efficiency, technology, the wish of Spanish businessmen to play a role appropriate to their country's industrial development in the integration of the African continent into the world economy. This is what the king and the new Spanish ambassador to Malabo, M Andrada Valderville, represent.

The other aspect is that of the Spanish landed proprietors who own 85 percent of the cacao plantations in Bioco, about 39,000 hectares, which they had to give up gradually from 1973 to 1979, and who are returning to-day to get them back. This return can be beneficial, taking into account the ageing of the plantations and the necessity to rejuvenate them. Those affected had until the end of February to ask for restitution, to which the government is not opposed, subject to payment of a custodial charge during the period of abandonment and submission of an investment plan for restoring cultivation and modernizing the equipment. What is to be feared is that this return might be accompanied, like that of all emigrations, by a certain nonrecognition of the laws of competition and a conservative attachment to the idea of a game preserve, rather than the motto "May the best man win."

It is probable, in fact, that the youth of Equatorial Guinea who, for 11 years, have associated with other foreigners, learned other languages and sometimes visited other countries, all of which have left their imprint, would not consider that the satisfaction of again meeting old friends must imply reserving a monopoly of friendship and accompanying preferences for them. Whatever the partners may be otherwise, any confusion in this area would be unpleasantly resented. Lieutenant Colonel Obiang did not appreciate Gabon's haste in demanding for Petrogab the right to explore the adjoining sea areas, and it does not seem that a project for an agreement with analogous objectives, proposed in December in Madrid to M Severino Obiang, secretary general of the Commissariat for Industry, has received the approval of the Junta tecnica\*.

International Options of the New Government

The eclecticism which the new authorities demonstrate in their foreign policy is a good illustration of this state of mind. After a period of hesitancy during which he did not give the impression of being opposed in principle to Spanish interests, Macie Nguema progressively took refuge in

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<sup>\*</sup>Francisco was Macie Nguema's first name, like that of the Caudillo. Macie is the "authentic" African form of Macias which the ex-president himself adopted.

<sup>\*</sup>Civil ministry. See the government makeup in MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 March 1980, p 572.

sullen isolation, favorable to the task of following the political advice of his Soviet advisers; the latter did not neglect to conclude fruitful deep-sea fishing agreements for their trawlers with him. The new chief of state was eager to break these agreements. But for all that he has not broken ties with either the USSR or its allies, North Korea, Cuba and Libya, and still less, of course, with People's China. It even seems that he is negotiating with the USSR--not without asperity, and confronting them with the Spanish proposals--new fishing agreements including the installation of refrigeration facilities and the sale to the people at imposed prices of a part of their catches.

Equatorial Guinea thus presents today the sometimes surprising spectacle of a country whose orientation, specifically in the Sahara affair, would place it on the right wing of the OAU but which, faithful to this organization, nonalined, a member of the Association of Lome, acts in such a way that technicians of East and West are encouraged to cooperate with each other on its soil. Thus, inasmuch as the military assistance treaty signed in 1977 by the USSR has not been abrogated, the Russian specialists charged with maintaining military equipment and the dozen-odd pilots and mechanics assigned to the governmental squadron, composed of a Yak 40, a 22-seat Antonov and a helicopter, remain where they are. Lieutenant Colonel Obiang avoids boarding these craft. But since the Antonov's crew risks contracting regrettable habits of indolence under this regime, the Russians have agreed to put it at the disposal of the LAGE\*. Their pilots thus insure the daily transporting from Malabo to Bata and from Bata to Malabo not only of national passengers but also of numerous western mission chiefs and Spanish development assistance personnel. In the same way, about ten Soviet advisers based at Bata philosophically await better days, the "Does one ever know?" written on their faces not seeming to disturb the government excessively. The Cubans' effective force reached 200 assorted technicians and instructors in 1975. Today there are still 25, including 15 at the embassy, two doctor-and-nurse teams, one at Bata and the other at Malabo, and also three forestry experts in Rio Muni whose activity seems to be very slow. As to the Chinese, their large number, several hundred, is explained by the fact that besides their activities in providing assistance--15 of them, including 9 doctors, provide various services and specifically that of staffing the surgical section at the Bata Hospital--they have started various projects with their own manpower: a very beautiful embassy at Malabo, a hydroelectric power station at Picomo, 13 kilometers from Bata, a 75-Km hardtop road from Ncue to Mongomo and the installation of automatic telephone exchanges at Bata and Malabo, the first having been completed and the second to be inaugurated in a few weeks. To their credit as well is the supply of a mini-liner, the Acacio-Manie, which connects Bata with Bioco and the other islands.

<sup>\*</sup>Lineas aeras de Guinea Ecuatorial [Equatorial Guinea Airlines], company operating lines in the interior, whose statutes are still poorly spelled out.

As for western aid and international organizations, numerous programs have been set up, but the effective forces of the developmental assistance entities are reduced to a minimum. Morocco gave Equatorial Guinea 10 tons of staples and medicines in September, coinciding with the arrival of a delegation of doctors and engineers. It is known, moreover, that Lieutenant Colonel Obiang's bodyguard consists of two officers, ten noncommissioned officers and 100 enlisted men detached from the Sherifian [Moroccan] Army. A rumor even circulated in Malabo that the Spanish government, irritated by a situation that it considers prejudicial to its good relations with Algeria, because of the close cooperation which it maintains with Equatorial Guinea, had proposed without success to replace them with a company from the Tercio.

Several western ambassadors accredited to Malabo, but not having their residence there, have come in recent months to present themselves to the Guinean authorities: Monseigneur Uhac, apostolic legate, and Mrs Mabel Smythe, whose trip marked the reestablishment of good relations with the United States which fortuitous circumstances, not linked to politics, had clouded several years ago. However, it was the international cooperation organizations which made the most spectacular effort to bring the country immediate assistance which, from all evidence, was most urgently needed—a third of its people having emigrated abroad, the volume of its exports having plummeted by about seven eighths, while its agricultural equipment, its highway infrastructure and its industrial equipment had in some cases been damaged to the point of total irrecoverability.

On the day after the coup d'etat, a telegram from M Claude Cheysson assured the government in Malabo of rapid support from the EEC, whose activities had been suspended for the most part because of the grave suspicions which hovered over the deeds of the ex-president. A mission led by M Hauswirth, deputy director for development aid, soon arrived on the spot to make this promise concrete, the files of projects to be carried out having to be presented to the offices of the commission before 1 May. The breakdown of this emergency program is given below; it amounts to 6.3 million European units of account, or 1.35 billion CFA equivalent at the parallel exchange rate to the same amount of expweles\*. It looks to the accelerated development of the only food resources which there are in Bioco, small market gardening and fishing, as well as the minimum maintenance of the roads of Rio Muni and the purchase of equipment with corresponding technical assistance, permitting their more complete repairs.

<sup>\*</sup>Theoretically aligned on the peseta, the ekpwele, at the chancellery rates, is worth 3.75 CFA francs. At the parallel exchange rate, it is exchanged for 1 CFA franc.

## European Development Fund Equatorial Guinea. Emergency Program

- -- Public Health -- Supply, addition to and overhaul of the equipment of the Ebebeyin and Mongomo hospitals. Pharmaceutical products. 1 million UCE [EEC units of account].
- -- Agriculture -- Small farming. Market gardening. Animal husbandry. Seed. Plant sanitation products for the Moca valley. 840,000 UCE.
- -- Public Works -- Equipment for maintenance of laterite roads and surfaced roads. Technical assistance.  $\bf 1$  million UCE.
- -- Fishing -- Study. Technical assistance to fishermen. Reequipping for artisan fishing. Equipment. 850,000 UCE.
- -- Electric Energy -- Restoration of the Malabo power grid.  $2.4\ \mathrm{million}$  UCE.
- -- Reserve -- 282,000 UCE.

This program must be presented to the EEC offices within 3 months.

A UN mission under the direction of M Gordon Goudrey, deputy secretary general, accompanied by representatives of various agencies concerned, came to study the assistance which it could offer on a longer term basis, in the form of operating credits and assignment of experts. The African Development Bank, finally, took charge of repairs to the Bata airport runway, for an amount of 500,000 UC [units of account] (about \$650.000).

Among these various actions, that of France merits special mention. Our country was completely disinterested, during the colonial period, in this half-insular, half-continental entity, and Rio Muni existed for all practical purposes as far from the Cameroons and Gabon as if nature had placed it in Patagonia. It was President Ahidjo who, during a trip by Pompidou to Yaounde, attracted his attention to the singular activity which the USSR was deploying there and the interest which he might have in following it more closely. Whence the opening in Malabo, in 1969, of a French Embassy. Still today, our ambassador is the only chief of a Western diplomatic mission having his residence in Equatorial Guinea. The political interest of the post has not, moreover, excluded all economic activity; two French firms, Dragages and the CRFM [expansion not known], have been able to get settled there on the initiative of the Financial Union for Africa. Dragages completed the modern port of Bata, a bridge over the Ekuku, an imposing presidential palace which only the king and queen of Spain have so far lived in, during their recent visit, and finally two office buildings housing the services of the Central Bank at Bata and Malabo, for a total price of 40 million dollars overall, the settlement of which caused no difficulty. Macie was a good payer . . . .

This technical assistance given to the previous administraton is not apt in any way to interfere with our cooperative effort, which, moreover, finds some of its former counterparts at the wheels of state. Our cultural center is functioning conveniently in Bata. There, 150 students of French are enrolled. A French film festival was recently organized there with complete success, and one could only deplore the poverty of its equipment; the professional quality of its director and promotor seemed worthy of better. Two young French people, a doctor and a nurse from "Doctors without Frontiers," are helping at the Bata hospital, under the direction of an African chief doctor, with Chinese and Cuban coworkers. But it is at Malabo that France's effort is most noticeable. It was recently placed in relief by the visit of Robert Galley and the installation next to the embassy of an aid and cooperation mission, in charge of a program of 10 million French francs, the details of which follow. Added to this is a study on conditions of maritime fishing which is slated to result in a project carried out by means of an execution loan.

# French Funds for Assistance and Cooperation Equatorial Guinea

-- Putting the port of Malabo in condition, lst stage: 8 million French francs. -- Leak-proofing the joints between the blocks of the 200-meter quay. Reconstruction of the work platform of the quay. Repairs to the system for distribution of water to ships.

A second later stage will include: electrical repairs and installations; putting shops in condition; construction of buildings for garages, workshops, offices and sanitary facilities.

- -- Geology. General inventory and mine prospecting maps: 2 million French francs. Documentary and photogeological study. Geological reconnaissance sections. Mine prospecting tests.
- $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$  Fishing.  $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$  Studies. Upgrading of fishing gear. Possible purchase of a sardine boat.

The main part of this program, entrusted for study of the preliminary project and for control of the work to BCEOM (Central Study Office for Overseas Equipment), and for execution to Dragages, is the **repairs** to the Malabo port; the poor condition of its quays is a dangerous handicap for unloading of cargos.

It remains true, nevertheless, that the historic, linguistic and commercial history of Spain gives it, in the matter of cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, a precedence and a superiority which it is neither our intention nor in our interest to dispute. Moreover, it is not certain that, among our possible actions, those which are in the area of development assistance are in the area most likely to be of interest to the young state.

Stages of a Renewal

Equatorial Guinea's basic problems result more from the defunct dictator's negligence than from the massacres for which he is blamed. It was not, moreover, to these massacres that Lieutenant Colonel Obiang referred to justify his action in the proclamation made on the evening of 3 August 1979, but rather to "the incapacity of the ex-president, to the political and diplomatic isolation which he imposed on his country and the economic and administrative paralysis which characterized his administration."

The last normal harvests, before independence, were 40,000 tons of cacao and 8,000 tons of coffee. In 1978, these tonnages had fallen, for the whole territory, to 8,000 tons of cacao and 1,500 tons of coffee. Figures on palm tree products (3,000 tons of oil exported in 1968) were no longer kept after 1973. The same holds for the abaca, production of which should be sufficient to meet the needs for bagging coffee and cacao, or about 800,000 bags.

It is to giving this production a new start that the government and more precisely the Commissariat for Agriculture should give priority. The return of the former Spanish owners to Bioco can provide a partial solution for the problem, in the measure to which the latter are disposed to finance a rejuvenation of their plantations and the modernizing of drying installa tions. However, the problem of manpower for this work remains, both for planting and for harvesting. Since the interruption of the annual immi-gration of Nigerian laborers, which it will be hard to reestablish, mangager has been in tragically short supply, as shown by the pods of the previous harvests hanging, rotted or dried up, from the branches of the trees. Macie Nguema tried to remedy this by bringing Fangs from the continent to the island, to reinforce the local ethnic group, the Bubis, who are insufficient in number and more inclined to small commerce than to agr. culture. What remains on the spot of the Fang immigration is hurrying onto the bridge of the Acadio Manie to get back to Bata. Therefore, the government is sending recruiting missions to the manpower-exporting African countries: Rwanda, Burundi and Upper Volta. To the extent that this problem is not solved, and it can only be done gradually, at will be difficult to demand from the planters the necessary investments to resume production on the cacao plantations.

The presence of manpower in Rio Muni would tend to make one think that its agricultural resources, today hardly tapped, would bring a more rapid yield. Cacao plantation production proceeds haltingly there, and coffee exploitation is only know in the form of picking, in the absence of any infrastructure permitting reproduction through propagation by curtings and multiplication by clones. It seems that at this stage, an intervention by the French research institutes, whose qualifications are today marivaled in Africa, would have to play a determining role, without great costs for cooperation, European or international financing being able to take over in this area from studies whose prefinancing should be facilitated. It

would, in any case, be desirable for this phase of selection and research to precede concrete operations, already envisaged for the oil-palm tree and the abaca by the French firm ERA (Agricultural Enterprises and Projects). Putting back into shape the large oil-palm plantations and the integrated factories, 1,500 hectares in all, specifically in the Mbini sector on the Rio Benito, is a job requiring much time and labor; however, it ought to give a certain primacy to Rio Muni with relation to the insular sector, taking into account speculative and new-area plantings which it is planned to carry out there, specifically for sugar cane. Exploitation of the forests, for local saw mills and export, has started again since January on a monthly basis of 7,000 cubic meters.

This progress supposes the existence of means of communication. The Commissariat for Public Works is seeking financing for the complete repair, on Bioco Island, of 50 Km of hardtop roads and, on the continent, of arterial highways also in hardtop from Bata to Niefang in the north and from Bata toward Mbini in the south, as well as for the retracing of land routes. Also planned is the construction of an international airport in Malabo, with improvement of ground aeronautical installations. Surveys for these work sites, with preliminary studies if any to be funded by prefinancing, would constitute advisable procedures for the French firms. The joining of Niefang to the Cameroon network, in the north, and that of Mbini to the Gabon network, in the south, will translate, moreover, into interesting commercial possibilities for the French firms well established in those two countries. Socoge, at Malabo, is giving an example of this dynamic activity by constructing a brewery of 100,00 [as printed] hectoliters representing a financing of 800 million CFA.

In the area of oil, finally, about which there is much talk in Equatorial Guinea, the geological probabilities in lieu of actual drilling arouse hope for the existence of deposits offshore [in italics]; Elf-Aquitaine is to present a research program for which the experience acquired and the success attained in neighboring Gabon are a solid reference.

However, carrying out of these actions is linked to the interlocutory settlement of currency problems. The ekpwele is not insolvent. It is backed by the Guinean property in Madrid, valued at 8 million dollars, not taking into account certain commercial debts which Macie Nguema had neglected to collect. The brutal import curbs during his administration reinforced its solidity, which is not put in doubt by the International Monetary Fund. The simple game of supply and demand tends, however, toward the devaluation of a currency theoretically aligned on the peseta, with respect to the CFA franc. The foreign currency reserves, satisfactory in a period of recession, seem moreover to be insufficient to back the indebtedness required for the restoration of agricultural and industrial capital and infrastructures. What can the government at Malabo do in such a situation to guarantee remuneration of their capital to potential suppliers

and investors? One of the first measures which can be envisaged, which however addresses only one aspect of the problem, would be to bring the ekpwele back to its actual exchange value, i.e., to devalue it by 60.19 percent. Another solution would be to obtain its free convertibility with the peseta, by opening an operating account for Equatorial Guinea with the Spanish treasury, following a mechanism analogous to that of the franc zone, which presupposes the agreement of the two interested parties. As far as one can judge, the responsible offices, besides fearing that such a solution will provoke a certain hemorrhaging of currency, through bringing back to Spain of Spanish accounts blocked in Malabo, would first like to put their budget in readiness (that for 1980, not yet published, would only reach the modest amount of one billion ekpwele) and to assure control of their economic structures so as to avoid an invasion by foreign firms. Moreover, Spain's viewpoint is not known, and what--if the case should arise--its agreement would provide in return. This monetary problem does not completely paralyze the rebirth of a country which can always count on subsidies and low-interest loans from foreign or international public assistance for carrying it out. But it is a question here less of rebirth itself than of resources contributing to create, with the infrastructures, the means of rebirth. Taking into account its geographical situation, the range of its production and the size of its population, one hardly sees any development possible for Equatorial Guinea except through what the Cameroon calls "controlled liberalism." Without discovery of a wealth of oil, its only choice is between this way and autarchical retrenchment to the depths of the forest. It is, after all, because of having chosen the second solution that Macie Nguema is dead.

In our issue of 7 March 1980, p 572, we wrote, on the basis of information received from generally well-informed sources, that Capt Ela Nzeng, who was second vice president of Equatorial Guinea, had been removed from the government "probably for betrayal of trust." Certain sources in Malabo prefer to speak of "inadaptability" to explain the nomination of this officer to the post of ambassador to Peking. We also wrote that Captain Riquesa, today second vice president, was the prosecutor in the trial of Macias Nguema last September. He was actually president of the tribunal which judged the former chief of state.

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5586 CSO: 4400

GUINEA-BISSAU

CABRAL ON LUSOPHONE TIES, SAHARA, WEST AFRICAN BLOC

LD031133 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 May-8 Jun 80 pp 45-50

[Interview with President Luis Cabral of Guinea-Bissau by Simon Malley in Bissau: "Fighting Hard To Build Up the Country"; date not specified]

[Excerpts] Simon Malley: As regards the situation in Guinea, what is the importance of the cooperation which has enabled you to develop the economy over the last 5 years? With which countries have you cooperated effectively, and what are your hopes for the years to come?

Luis Cabral: Our country has always declared its desire to establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all the peoples of the world. We were helped by certain countries in the war; after independence, we naturally continued to cooperate with the same countries. Thus the Soviet Union supplies us with important aid, as much in the defense sphere as in such areas as electricity, commerce and so forth. The same applies to Sweden, which today cooperates with us in such varied fields as rural development, energy, health and transport; similarly, we cooperate with other countries. such as the Netherlands, France and other EC countries. We are signatories of the Lome convention, whose implementation opened up interesting possibilities for our country, notably in the fields of freight, roads infrastructure and other projects. We are open to any country wishing to maintain relations with us on the basis of respect for our sovereignty and our anticolonialist and antimperialist position.

Simon Malley: Comrade President, I observe that you have not mentioned Portugal at all, which is astonishing, given the relations which might have been achieved after Guinea's independence on the one hand and the 1974 Portuguese revolution on the other. Is this because basically Portugal has for some time been occupying a new position, or because it has not been able to break away from its colonialist mentality?

Luis Cabral: Portugal is a country with which we have long-standing relations. After the destruction of colonialism, we entered afresh into relations on a new and positive basis. It is to our own and the

Portuguese leaders' credit that we ended the state of war between our two countries. We are striving to develop our very fine cooperation for the benefit of our respective peoples. This cooperation basically relates to education and, above all, commerce. In our foreign trade Portugal is by far the major partner.

Simon Malley: You have spoken, Comrade President, of links between Guinea and certain countries. Some time ago in Maputo, the heads of state of the former Portuguese colonies met for the second time. What is your view of relations and of the future ties which should unite the five countries of the former conference of the national organizations of the Portuguese colonies?

Luis Cabral: These relations are of long standing. They go back to an age when we were confronting the same colonialist power, when conditions were very different. The same struggle caused the development among the leaders of our country of relations of confidence based on fidelity to our African people's struggle for liberation. This represents valuable capital, which we are striving to invest in the field of cooperation. Much is said about unity in Africa. I think that there are very few countries in Africa which are similar to us and which possess as great a store of confidence as we do. And I can tell you that in Guinea-Bissau we are ready to go as far as possible, as far as my comrades in other African countries with a Portuguese background, in this field of cooperation and unity.

Simon Malley: Comrade President, do you believe in the unity of these countries?

Luis Cabral: I believe in the unity of these countries just as I believe in African unity. Our unity and cooperation is aimed at the African unity of which our African political leaders speak.

Simon Malley: Some newspapers say that certain members of these five countries are more reticent about the idea of creating a group or bloc, which would risk difficulties with their neighbors. How do you yourself envisage the future of relations among the five?

Luis Cabral: I think that the future of any kind of relations between any countries lies in cooperation. We want to cooperate among ourselves. That is not to say that this cooperation will be limited only to our states. If we succeed in creating something of value, each of us would want neighboring countries adopting the same stances and with the same concept of cooperation between African countries to come and join the initial group.

Simon Malley: The five countries have very firm anti-imperialist positions. They stand for true nonalinement, in the positive sense of the word. In what precise areas could this cooperation among yourselves be

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realized: in the economic, cultural or social fields; or do you equally envisage that it will embrace the political field?

Luis Cabral: I cannot speak unilaterally. I should not wish to appear to want more than my comrades from Angola and Mozambique; I can only tell you that we do want this cooperation and that we are prepared to go as far as possible.

Simon Malley: Guinea-Bissau was one of the first African countries to recognize the Saharan Arab Republic. What was your motive in giving this early recognition?

Luis Cabral: You know that we proclaimed our state during the war. At that time, Guinea-Bissau was the subject of the same resolutions by international organizations which today recognize that the people of the Sahara have the right to self-determination and independence. This similarity is an additional motive: The same historical conditions caused the emergence of our states, of Guinea in the bush and the forests of Boe, and of the Sahara people in the desert.

Simon Malley: Everyone knows that Morocco is in a state of total impasse and that it is threatening to attack Algeria. What would be your reaction to this eventuality?

Luis Cabral: We greatly hope that there will be peace in the region. Algeria and Morocco are two African countries with which we have great friendship. You know what Algeria means to Africa, to people who have had to take up arms for their independence. Morocco, too, is a country that is very dear to us. It was one of the first countries to give us arms to fight the Portuguese. This gesture causes us to entertain feelings of friendship and gratitude toward the people and government of Morocco. It is our hope that this spirit, which led Morocco to adopt such a progressive position with regard to our people's liberation struggle, will prevail and persuade the Moroccan state to recognize the Saharan people's rights to self-determination and independence and to inaugurate peace and cooperation among all these regions' peoples. Our government, with its small means, is ready to do everything to prevent a confrontation between the fraternal peoples of Algeria and Morocco.

Simon Malley: It is known that your country possesses very limited resources in all, and this applies to neighboring countries, too. The idea of development on the basis of regional regrouping is being debated and discussed. Have you an opinion on this strategic question?

Luis Cabral: I do not think that it is right to look at our country in isolation. The problem of overcoming underdevelopment can only be viewed in terms of entities which increase natural resources and productivity among the population. It is necessary for underdeveloped countries to develop real, horizontal cooperation and to emerge united before the

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richest countries in order to end the injustice of economic dependence. As far as we are concerned, we think that we can do much more to exploit our resources, but we certainly do need our international aid. We receive considerable aid; we can say that we benefit from firm solidarity with several countries of the world ruled by different regimes. But to emerge from underdevelopment requires more than international aid. That is why our government supports all efforts to regroup the countries of Africa. We supported the creation of the CDAE [as published; expansion unknown; possibly misprint for CEAO, West African Economic Community] and we decided to lend all our support to this community, to which we belong. That is why we are helping to bring about true cooperation between Guinea-Bissau and countries such as Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde.

Simon Malley: I should like to ask a final question concerning political philosophy: The socialist world is experiencing an unfortunate division, which evidently has an adverse effect on the interests of Third World countries. Essentially it is a question of the division between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Having received aid from both these countries and from certain European countries, how do you view this problem?

Luis Cabral: We greatly regret this divergence between the countries which were our friends during our national liberation movement struggle, and we would state that it does much harm to liberation movements and sometimes affects the unity of liberation movements in certain countries. However, it is not for us to pass judgment on this problem, since that lies within the province of the communist parties. Insofar as we are a national, democratic and revolutionary party, we endeavor to maintain relations with all these countries. And we encourage rapprochement when we can, since we think that this will help to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp as well as of the developing countries.

Simon Malley: Could the nonalined countries not influence this unity?

Luis Cabral: I do not think that the nonalined countries have the means of exerting the slightest influence on this conflict. What they can do is to avoid fanning the flames, and to try through a positive attitude to prevent a widening of the gap between these countries, which were our allies during our struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

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MADAGASCAR

## BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH PRC COOLER--Some PRC economic cooperation projects, especially the building of the Antananarivo-Toamasina highway, were suspended several months ago. On the other hand, the USSR continues to ship in arms and military equipment in exchange for Malagasy coffee. [Excerpt] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 May 80 p 46]

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RWANDA

## BRIEFS

EEC AID--At the end of December 1979, the total volume of EEC aid to Rwanda was 119.9 million European units of account (11UCE = about \$1.40 or 5.86 French francs), that is 13.8 billion Rwanda francs. The amounts of the first 3 European development funds were totally as subsidies: the fourth FED (60.1 million UCE) has 4.4 percent loans. For total CEE financing, the sector allocation (in percent) is: rural development, 35.5; energy, 35.6; roads and equipment, 14.7; education, 11.5; miscellaneous, 2.7. The main projects financed include development of tea plantations creation of processing plants, electric infrastructures, extension of distribution network, road building and modernization, bridge building, building of educational and administrative buildings. The fourth FED also provided financing for implementing regional projects concerning besides Rwanda, neighboring countries, Ruzizi II center (Burundi and Zaire), Butare-Kayanza (Burundi), Rusumo-Isaka road (Tanzanie, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia) general East African transportation system, study of the extraction of methane gas from the Kivu lake. From the EEC, Rwanda benefited by food aid (wheat, flour, milk powder, butter-oil), supply of vehicles and fuel as gifts. Finally as a result of pyrethra export in 1978, Rwanda received in 1979 through the Stabex procedure the equivalent of 609,000 UCE, that is, 75.8 million Rwanda francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 1980 p 1105] 9018

KIGALI BANK--The balance on 31 December 1979 of the Kigali Bank was altogether 4.6 billion Rwanda francs (1 FRw = approximately 0.05 French franc). The volume of the deposits and the clients sight and term accounts represented 2.7 billion in hand, the commitments (portfolio of commercial assets and advances) amounted to 1.9 billion. Excluded from the balance, the guarantees supplied for third parties and debtors by acceptances amounted to 1.2 billion Rwanda francs. After amortisement for provisions and taxes, the 1979 budget showed the net result of 56.3 billion Rwanda francs, for which the General Assembly of 24 March 80 distributed a 13.50 percent dividend on a 150 million capital, which is accompanied by 85 million reserve. The Kigali Bank has as its president Mr Jean-Marie Vianney Nyalihama and Mr Leandre Degroot is the general manager as Deputy Administrator. The Kigali office is completed by 2 branches at Ruhengeri and Rwamagana. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 1980 p 1105] 9018

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ZAIRE

## AGREEMENT ON REFINANCING OF BANK DEBT SIGNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1048

[Text] The Republic of Zaire has announced the signing in Paris on 23 April of an agreement to refinance its syndicated and uninsured bank debt; i.e., some \$434 million owed to 100 banks.

The financial arrangements of this agreement provide for a term of 10 years with a grace period of 5 years and the interest rate calculated on the basis of the Libor (London interbank rate) increased by a margin of 1 7/8 percent for the first 5 years and 2 percent thereafter.

Zaire has also made a commitment to pay off the totality of the arrearages in interest existing as of 31 January 1980 (\$33.6 million) as well as 10 percent of the arrearages in principal (\$283 million) as of the same date. Moreover, during the grace period, Zaire will pay sums representing 14 percent of the arrearages in principal as of the 31 January 1980 reference date.

The commissioner of state for finance, Namwisi Ma Koyi, said that the various actions taken by the government of Zaire, namely the stabilization program, the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the placing in order of foreign financial commitments and the mobilization of foreign aid have produced positive and encouraging results up to now.

The governor of the Bank of Zaire, Emony Mondanga, also expressed the wish that this agreement would inaugurate a new phase in the relations between Zaire and the commercial banks and contribute in a significant way to the reestablishment of Zaire's credit.

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ZAIRE

## BRIEFS

FRG MEDICAL GIFT--The Federal Republic of Germany has offered Zaire 11 tons of medicines worth 300,000 deutsche marks as humanitarian aid. This medical shipment will be the third delivery of an overall aid project worth 3 million marks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1048] 8143

FRG PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AID—The Federal Republic of Germany recently presented a cooperation proposal to the Zairian executive council involving the revival of the Kinois Transport Company (STK). This cooperation would be implemented in two stages: the first phase; i.e., technical cooperation, would consist of the training in Europe of mechanics and administrative cadres, the purchase of spare parts, and the rebuilding of the company's depot installations. This stage represents a gift from the German government on the order of 1.5 million deutsche marks; as for the second phase, it will consist of the delivery by the FRG to the STK of a loan guaranteed by the Zairian state for the purchase of 100 buses, 100 motor coaches, one wrecker, one truck, one jeep and equipment for a mechanical workshop. However, the implementation of this plan will not be possible unless the two parties reach an agreement on making the STK financially sound. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1048] 8143

CANADIAN PAPER PULP PLANT--The Canadian company, International Baryum Mining Canada Ltd., will construct a wood exploitation plant in Mushie, in the Bandundu region. This plant will employ about 150 persons, and its cost is estimated at \$7.5 million. During a second stage, the company reportedly intends to invest \$20 million to install a paper pulp manufacturing plant which would employ 750 workers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1048] 8143

COFFEE TRANSPORT—Guidelines for the transport and export of coffee are the subject of a circular issued 6 March 1980 by the Zairian Coffee Office (OZACAF). According to the text of this circular, it is mandatory for all coffee destined for export to pass in transit through OZACAF warehouses or through warehouses specially designated by the office for this purpose. Samples will be taken exclusively in these warehouses. Designated warehouses, other than those of OZACAF, have been placed under the joint

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control of the owner and OZACAF. All coffee is warehoused in such places pursuant to the mandatory in transit regulations. With a view to assuring the quality of Zairian coffee on foriegn markets, OZACAF may impose certain procedures upon plants which prepare coffee for export. OZACAF makes sales contracts available to exporters. Proposals for contracts to be concluded between exporters and foreign buyers will be submitted to OZACAF for prior review. The office reserves the right, within a 24 hour period, to designate to the seller a buyer offering a higher price, with whom the exporter will get in touch to conclude a contract on the new bases of the price offered. A deadline of 24 hours is given the new buyer to confirm to the seller his firm and definitive offer. Except in the case of withdrawal of the new buyer, OZACAF's counterproposal excludes any possibility of renegotiation on the part of the buyer proposed by the seller. These regulations were adopted to assure the interests of the state and exporters. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1100] 8143

COOPERATIONS WITH FRENCH COMPANY--It is known that last year the French Geological and Mining Prospecting Office (BRGM) purchased the 28 percent share held by Amoco Minerals in the Tenke-Fungurume Mining Company (SMTF), which made the BRGM, with 34.4 percent of the capital, the principal stockholder of the SMTF, along with the Zairian government (20 percent), Charter Consolidated (28 percent), Mitsui (14 percent), Tempelmans and Sons (3 percent) and OMNIMINES [expansion unknown] (0.6 percent). (On this subject see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS dated 20 July 1970, p 2054). Reportedly it is now a question of the General Company for Nuclear Materials (COGEMA, an exploitation subsidiary of the French Commissariat for Nuclear Atomic Energy) buying the shares of the BRGM, which would give the COGEMA the possibility of diversifying its activities, up to now centered on uranium (particularly in Niger), by participating in the exploitation of a high-yield copper deposit of exceptional size: Tenke-Fungurume in fact is said to have about 3 million tons of copper metal and 320,000 tons of cobalt. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1048] 8143

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